Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement:  Legislation vs. Litigation by Price, Martine J.
Journal of Law and Policy
Volume 11 | Issue 1 Article 7
2002
Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement:
Legislation vs. Litigation
Martine J. Price
Follow this and additional works at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at BrooklynWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Law and
Policy by an authorized editor of BrooklynWorks.
Recommended Citation
Martine J. Price, Addressing Ex-Felon Disenfranchisement: Legislation vs. Litigation, 11 J. L. & Pol'y (2002).
Available at: https://brooklynworks.brooklaw.edu/jlp/vol11/iss1/7
PRICEMACRO11-23.DOC 4/1/03 2:49 PM 
 
369 
ADDRESSING EX-FELON 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT: LEGISLATION VS. 
LITIGATION 
Martine J. Price* 
INTRODUCTION 
More than one million convicted ex-felons who have 
completed their sentences are permanently prohibited from voting 
in the United States.1 Felony disenfranchisement laws have 
existed since the colonial age and increased in importance and 
effect in the post-Civil War era.2 This practice effectively and 
disproportionately prohibited many African Americans from 
participating in the electoral process, and it continues to have the 
same effect today.3 As a result, many affected individuals as well 
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1 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN 
THE UNITED STATES 1 (2001) [hereinafter THE SENTENCING PROJECT]. THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT estimates, “1.4 million disenfranchised persons are ex-
offenders who have completed their sentences.” Id. 
2 Andrew L. Shapiro, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under 
the Voting Rights Act: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L.J. 537, 538 (1993). Some 
Southern states altered the criminal disenfranchisement laws so that they 
would have a greater impact on black voters. Id. These states included 
Mississippi, South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Virginia. Id. at 541. 
3 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 1. According to The 
Sentencing Project, thirteen percent of black men in the U.S. are 
disenfranchised. Id. 
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as public interest organizations have attempted to modify felony 
disenfranchisement laws to ameliorate the distinction created by 
the impact of the laws on minority groups.4 
Disenfranchisement laws began in the United States as an 
outgrowth of the English practice of imposing collateral civil 
consequences to felony convictions.5 Traditionally, this practice 
was justified by the belief that convicted felons were more 
susceptible to voter corruption and fraud.6 Disenfranchisement 
                                                          
4 JAMIE FELLNER & MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY 
DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 1 (1998). Groups such as 
The Sentencing Project and Human Rights Watch frequently monitor 
legislative and judicial activity with regard to disenfranchisement and conduct 
research that may be used in lawsuits brought by ex-felons. Id. In 2000, The 
Sentencing Project reported that legislators in Alabama, Florida, 
Pennsylvania, Nevada and Connecticut have proposed legislation lessening 
restrictions on ex-felons’ voting rights. PATRICIA ALLARD & MARC MAUER, 
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REGAINING THE VOTE: AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACTIVITY RELATING TO FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 4-9 (2000). 
Additionally, lawsuits were filed in the past several years in states such as 
New Hampshire, Washington and Pennsylvania in which challenges to the 
existing disenfranchisement statutes have been made. Id.; see also infra Part 
I.C (discussing disenfranchisement litigation occurring in state courts). 
5 FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 2-3. The medieval English 
government would pass bills of attainder to restrict convicted felons’ rights by 
subjecting their property to forfeiture, prohibiting them from inheriting or 
bequeathing property and forbidding them from bringing suit in the court 
system. Id. 
6 See Washington v. State, 75 Ala. 582 (Ala. 1884). Courts traditionally 
argued that denying the right to vote to convicted ex-felons preserved the 
“purity of the ballot box” by protecting the foundation of democracy from ex-
felons who are unfit to vote. Id. at 585. In Kronlund v. Honstein, the court 
stated that the state’s interest in preserving the electoral process justifies the 
exclusion of those whose “behavior can be said to be destructive of society’s 
aims.” 327 F. Supp. 71, 73 (N.D. Ga. 1971). Courts rationalized that 
permitting ex-felons to vote could possibly disrupt the true intentions of 
upstanding citizens. FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 15. A California 
Supreme court decision reflects this. 
The fact that such person committed a crime is evidence that he was 
morally “corrupt” at the time he did so; if still morally corrupt when 
given the opportunity to vote in an election, he might defile “the 
purity of the ballot box” by selling or bartering his vote or otherwise 
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also served to protect the sanctity of the voting system and ensure 
that convicts could not influence the lawmaking process.7 After 
the Civil War, Southern legislatures attempted to limit the 
number of eligible black voters by altering felony 
disenfranchisement laws to include crimes that leaders believed 
were committed more frequently by blacks.8 Mississippi provided 
an ideal example for other Southern legislatures in 1890 when it 
narrowed the disenfranchisement statute’s application to “black” 
crimes such as bribery, burglary, theft and arson.9 
Today, felony disenfranchisement continues in varying forms 
throughout the United States.10 While two states allow ex-felons 
                                                          
engaging in election fraud; and such activity might affect the outcome 
of the election and thus frustrate the freely expressed will of the 
remainder of the voters. 
Otsuka v. Hite, 414 P.2d 412, 417 (Cal. 1966); see also FELLNER & MAUER, 
supra note 4, at 15; Note, The Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons: Citizenship, 
Criminality, and ‘The Purity of the Ballot Box,’ 102 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 
1308 (1989) [hereinafter Citizenship]; Special Project, The Collateral 
Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV. 929, 1173 (1970). 
7 FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 15. By disenfranchising ex-felons, 
their influence on the political process is eliminated, ensuring that elections 
were decided exclusively by “responsible” citizens. Id.; see also Citizenship, 
supra note 6, at 1309. 
8 Shapiro, supra note 2. 
9 Id. at 538 n.20. The relevant portion of the Mississippi Constitution 
stated “[e]very male inhabitant of the state . . . who has never been convicted 
of bribery, burglary, theft, arson, obtaining money or goods under false 
pretenses, forgery, embezzlement or bigamy . . . is declared to be a qualified 
elector.” MISS. CONST. art. VII § 241 (1890). See also Ratliff v. Beale, 20 
So. 865, 867 (Miss. 1896) (stating that the amended Mississippi Constitution 
contained an increased number of restrictions on the franchise). 
10 Nicholas Thompson, Locking Up the Vote; Former Prisoners Barred 
From Voting Under Florida Law, WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 2001, at 17. 
Thompson suggests that contemporary politicians continue to keep 
disenfranchisement statutes in place because without such laws they never 
would have been elected. Id. Thompson cites a sociological study that asserts 
that politicians such as John Warner, Mitch McConnell, Connie Mack, Phil 
Gramm and Craig Thomas may never have been elected if the felony 
disenfranchisement statutes in their respective states did not exist at the time of 
their elections. Id. Such data indicates that many politicians are unwilling to 
do anything to substantially alter the disenfranchisement statutes, fearing the 
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to vote while in prison,11 others permit ex-felons to vote only 
after completing parole.12 Twelve states permanently 
                                                          
loss of their own power. Id. Disenfranchisement constitutional provisions and 
statutes enacted several decades ago with the purpose of discrimination, 
therefore, continue to exist. Id. Virginia’s 1901 convention, for example, 
expanded the disenfranchisement laws in order to eliminate “every Negro 
voter who can be gotten rid of legally, without materially impairing the 
numerical strength of the white electorate,” id.; see also VA. CONST. art. II, § 
23 (1902). Alabama’s 1901 constitution was designed to “ensure white 
supremacy.” ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901). Florida’s 1868 constitution 
included a disenfranchisement provision that was contested by African 
Americans and radical Republicans. FLA. CONST. art. XIV, §§ 2, 4 (1868); 
see Thompson, supra. Furthermore, case law indicates that many states 
continue to justify disenfranchisement based on the beliefs of social contract 
theorist John Locke. See, e.g., Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (2d Cir. 1995). 
The social contract theory centers upon the idea that “morality is founded 
solely on uniform social agreements that serve the best interests of those who 
make the agreement.” James Fieser & Bradley Dowden, eds., Internet 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Social Contract, at 
http://www.utm.edu/research/iep/s/soc-cont.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2002). 
Expanding on this theory, Locke proposed that a government derives its 
authority from the consent of its citizens. See Garth Kemerling, Locke: Social 
Order, at http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/4n.htm#gov (last visited Oct. 
17, 2002). This relationship creates a contract that imposes obligations on both 
the political entity and its citizenry. Id. While the contract allows citizens to 
overthrow their government when it fails to meet the needs of society, it also 
authorizes society to take away privileges such as voting when a citizen has 
“abandoned the right to participate” by breaking the social contract. Baker, 58 
F.3d at 821 (indicating that the state’s articulated justification for 
disenfranchisement was based on the social contract theory set out in Green v. 
Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967)). A social contract is made 
between an individual and society when an individual enters society, 
authorizing the legislature to make laws to protect his own well being. Green, 
380 F.2d at 451. See also Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304, 1312 
(E.D. Wash. 1997) (relying on Green as support for the state’s position that 
disenfranchisement is justified); Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255, 1261 (6th 
Cir. 1986) (relying on Green). 
11 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1. These states are Maine 
and Vermont. Id.; see also ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 21, § 111 (2001) (listing 
the general qualifications in order to vote); ME. STAT. ANN. 21, § 115 (2001) 
(listing the restrictions on voter eligibility); VT. STAT. ANN. 17, § 2121 
(2002) (listing criteria for voter registration). 
12 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3; see also ALASKA 
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disenfranchise at least some ex-felons, even after sentence and 
parole completion.13 Sixteen states and the District of Columbia 
disenfranchise ex-felons only while they are in prison.14 While 
pardoning procedures exist in some states to restore voting 
                                                          
STAT. § 15.05.030 (Michie 2002); ARK. CONST. art. III, § 2 (Michie 2002); 
CAL. CONST. art. XX, § 11 (2001); CAL. STAT. § 14240 (West 2001); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 1-2-606(1) (2002); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 9-46(a) (2001); D.C. 
CODE ANN. § 1-1001.02(7) (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-216(b) (2002); 
MINN. STAT. § 201.014 (2001); MO. CONST. art. VIII, § 2 (2001); NEB. 
REV. STAT. § 32-313 (2002); N.J. REV. STAT. § 19:4-1 (2002); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 31-13-1 (Michie 2002); N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106 (McKinney 2002); 
N.C. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (2002); OKLA. STAT. tit. 26, § 4-101 (2002); R.I. 
CONST. art. II, § 1 (2002); S.C. CONST. art. III, § 7 (2001); TEX. ELEC. 
CODE ANN. § 11.002 (Vernon 2002); W. VA. CODE § 3-1-3 (2002); WIS. 
STAT. § 6.03 (2001). Delaware imposes a five-year waiting period after 
completion of sentence and parole before voting rights may be restored. THE 
SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit 15, § 
1701 (2001). 
13 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3. Alabama, Florida, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia and Wyoming permanently 
disenfranchise all ex-felons. See ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (2002); ALA. 
CONST. amend. 579 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 97.041(2)(b) (2001); IOWA CODE 
§ 48A.6 (2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 116.0452(2)(b) (Banks-Baldwin 
2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 23-15-19 (2001); NEV. CONST. art. 2, § 1 (2002); 
VA. CONST. art. II, § 1 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.2-101, 418 (2002); 
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 22-3-102 (Michie 2002). Arizona and Maryland 
permanently disenfranchise felons after conviction of a second felony. See 
ARIZ. CONST. art. 7, § 2(c) (2002); MD. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 3-102 (2002). 
Tennessee and Washington permanently disenfranchise felons convicted before 
1986 and 1984, respectively. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-143 (1981); 
WASH. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (2002). 
14 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3; see also D.C. CODE 
ANN. § 1-1001.02(7) (2002); HAW. CONST. art. II, § 2 (2002); IDAHO CONST. 
art. VI, § 3 (2002); 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-5 (2002); IND. CODE ANN. § 3-
7-13-4 (West 2002); KAN. CONST. art. V, § 2 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18:102 (West 2002); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. § 1 (2002); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS § 168.492a (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-1-111(2) (2002); N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 607-A:2, 654:5 (1986); N.D. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (2002); 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 161-04-04 (2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 
(West 2002); OR. CONST. art. II, § 3 (2001); 25 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1301 
(2002); S.D. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 20 A-2-101 
(2002). 
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rights,15 they are nonetheless difficult to obtain.16 
The disproportionate impact on African Americans and other 
minorities of many of these state statutes is undeniable.17 African-
                                                          
15 Restore Voting Rights After Prison Time, ATL. CONST., June 4, 2001, 
at A10, available at 2001 WL 3676390. These include Virginia, Florida, 
Kentucky and North Carolina. Id. 
16 ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 10. In Virginia, a felon must wait 
five years after completion of sentence and parole and have paid all fines and 
court fees. Id. If those conditions are satisfied, the felon must request a packet 
detailing the requirements from the Virginia Secretary of the Commonwealth’s 
Office and then can apply to the Governor for restoration of the right to vote. 
Id. The Governor has final authority over whether the felon’s voting rights are 
restored. VA. CONST. art. V, § 12. Only about one hundred people complete 
the process each year. Frank Green, Panel to Study Ex-felons’ Rights; Va. 
Restoration Process Difficult, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, June 20, 2001, at 
B1, available at 2001 WL 5326577. In Florida, a felon must obtain executive 
clemency in order to restore his voting rights. ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 
4, at 6. The Florida Parole Commission determines whether a felon is eligible 
for restoration, and refers a candidate to the Executive Board of Clemency. Id. 
If no members of the Clemency Board object, the Clemency Coordinator may 
restore the felon’s civil rights. Id. Recently, this process has been streamlined 
for some nonviolent, habitual offender ex-felons who no longer must attend a 
Clemency Board hearing. Julie Hauserman, Cabinet Eases Rules for Restoring 
Ex-felons’ Rights, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 15, 2001, at 4B (stating that 
nonviolent offenses include drug-related crimes). New rules enacted by the 
Florida Cabinet also increase the maximum amount of a felon’s outstanding 
court fines from two hundred and fifty dollars to one thousand dollars. Scott 
Hiaasen, Cabinet Expands Clemency Eligibility, PALM BEACH POST, June 15, 
2001, at 7B, available at 2001 WL 21884875. 
17 Andrew Shapiro, The Disenfranchised, AM. PROSPECT, Nov. 1, 1997, 
at 60, available at 1997 WL 21293207. Because blacks and other minorities 
such as Latinos are disproportionately represented within the criminal justice 
system, minority ex-felons make up a disproportionate share of the 
disenfranchised convicts within the United States. Id. For example, the New 
York Division of Criminal Justice Services issued a report in 1995 stating that 
black defendants were more likely to receive prison sentences than white 
defendants who had been convicted of similar crimes. Id. In several states, 
blacks comprise a larger portion of the prison population than whites even 
though blacks represent a smaller portion of the state’s total population. Alice 
E. Harvey, Ex-felon Disenfranchisement and its Influence on the Black Vote: 
The Need for a Second Look, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1145, 1151-52 (1994). For 
example, as of 1990, 0.9% of Alabama’s black population is incarcerated 
while 0.2% of whites are imprisoned. Id. In Delaware, 2% of the black 
PRICEMACRO11-23.DOC 4/1/03 2:49 PM 
 ADDRESSING EX-FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT 375 
American men account for an estimated thirty-six percent of all 
disenfranchised ex-felons.18 As a result, these statutes restrict the 
voting rights of thirteen percent of all adult African-American 
males.19 Furthermore, the impact is more extreme in certain 
individual states. For example, in both Alabama and Florida, 
thirty-one percent of all black men are permanently 
disenfranchised.20 In Iowa, Mississippi, New Mexico, Virginia 
and Wyoming, one in four black men is permanently 
disenfranchised.21 In Delaware, one in five black men are 
permanently disenfranchised.22 These statistics indicate that the 
current felony disenfranchisement laws have a significantly 
higher effect on minorities than on other groups within the 
country. 
Many of these statutes have been challenged in the twentieth 
century through the court system, as well as by state and federal 
legislatures, and each of these methods has had varying degrees 
of success.23 This note explains the approaches taken through 
litigation and legislation in both federal and state arenas. The 
strengths and weaknesses of each approach are evaluated, and 
this note ultimately concludes that state legislation has the most 
potential for success. Part I provides an overview of the litigation 
strategies employed to attack disenfranchisement laws. This 
includes a discussion of frequently utilized arguments involving 
the Equal Protection clause of the United States Constitution,24 
the Voting Rights Act25 and state constitutional litigation. Part II 
                                                          
population is imprisoned as compared to only 0.2% of the white population. 
Id. Similar statistics exist for other states, including Florida, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Tennessee, and Virginia. Id. See also Special Project, The 
Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 VAND. L. REV 5 (1970) 
(evaluating the impact of felony disenfranchisement on minority populations). 
18 ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 1. 
19 FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 8. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See infra Part I (discussing judicial decisions); see infra Part II 
(discussing legislation). 
24 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
25 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001). 
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analyzes attempts by federal and state legislatures to address this 
issue, including a federal congressional bill proposal.26 It also 
provides an overview of recent state legislation addressing this 
issue. Finally, this note identifies the most effective approach to 
achieve the goal of ending disenfranchisement and proposes a 
workable method to address the disparate impact on minorities. 
I. APPROACHES TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT LITIGATION 
Litigation is one of the most frequently used methods to 
address concerns about felony disenfranchisement.27 Lawsuits 
have typically focused on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection clause or the Voting Rights Act to challenge 
disenfranchisement laws.28 In state courts, litigants also derive 
arguments from state constitutional provisions.29 
A. The Equal Protection Clause 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”30 The original 
purpose of the clause was to assure equal treatment for former 
slaves in the post-Civil War period.31 Eventually, the clause was 
interpreted to require that governmental classifications be 
                                                          
26 See H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999) (granting ex-felons the right to vote 
in federal elections). 
27 See infra Part I.A.C (analyzing the different approaches to felony 
disenfranchisement litigation). 
28 See infra Part I.A (discussing how the Equal Protection Clause is used 
to attack felony disenfranchisement laws); see also Part I.B (discussing how 
the Voting Rights Act is used to attack felony disenfranchisement laws). 
29 See infra Part I.C (explaining how felony disenfranchisement laws are 
challenged in state courts). 
30 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
31 See GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 986, 628 (13th ed. 1997) (stating that the 14th Amendment’s most 
obvious and fundamental purpose was to address governmental racial 
discrimination). 
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reasonably related to the purpose of the legislation.32 The 
evolution of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the clause 
created different levels of scrutiny to determine whether a state 
action, law or classification has violated the clause.33 The most 
lenient type of review uses a “rational basis” standard to uphold 
the governmental classification as long as it bears a rational 
relationship to a legitimate objective.34 The middle level standard 
requires that the means chosen by the government must be 
substantially related to an important objective.35 Finally, the 
                                                          
32 Id. 
33 Id. at 629-30. The levels are rational review, middle level review and 
strict scrutiny. Id. 
34 Id. at 635. This standard requires only that a rational connection exist 
between a statute’s classification and the governmental purpose. Id. In other 
words, the means must “reasonably relate” to the ends. Id. at 629. The 
rational basis standard permits legislatures to act broadly and only minimally 
requires that the means “fit” the ends. Id. at 635. Its use is typified by the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 
106 (1949) (upholding a statute that prohibited advertising on the sides of 
vehicles because the classification was rationally related to the purpose of the 
statute to increase public safety). In Railway Express, the agency argued that 
the classification had no relation to the safety issue because some distracting 
advertisements are outlawed while others that may be damaging to public 
safety are not. Id. at 110. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that the Equal 
Protection Clause does not require that “all evils of the same genus be 
eradicated.” Id.; see also McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) 
(finding that a state could reasonably require certain businesses to remain 
closed on Sundays in order to protect the general public’s interest in health and 
encourage the “recreational atmosphere of the day”). In McGowan, the Court 
stated that “[t]he constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification 
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.” 
Id. at 425. 
35 GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 631-32. This standard, while not explicitly 
acknowledged by a majority of the Court, has nonetheless been utilized in 
cases. Id. The intermediate standard is more intensive than the rational basis 
review as it requires that the classifications are “important” and the means 
have a “persuasive justification.” Id. at 632. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 
U.S. 190 (1976) (declaring invalid a statute prohibiting the sale of beer to 
males under 21 and females under 18 for traffic safety purposes because the 
gender distinction did not “serve important governmental objectives” and was 
not “substantially related” to the achievement of traffic safety). 
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strictest level of review upholds a classification only if the law is 
necessary to advance a compelling governmental interest.36 Strict 
scrutiny is applied to any law that is based on a suspect 
classification or affects a fundamental right.37 
The Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of 
                                                          
36 GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 630. In the 1960s the Court articulated a 
new approach to the Equal Protection Clause that required the presence of 
either a suspect class or an impact on a fundamental right. Id.; see infra note 
37 (explaining the categories that require application of strict scrutiny review). 
The means must be necessary to achieve the ends and justified by a compelling 
state interest. Id. In equal protection cases that involve suspect classes, the 
Court has rarely found compelling state interests because classifications 
involving suspect classes are rigidly scrutinized. Id. at 664. In order to justify 
such a classification, the state must demonstrate that the law is essential for a 
public need. Id. For example, in Korematsu v. United States, the Court found 
that a law excluding Japanese people from certain areas on the West Coast 
constituted a “pressing public necessity” in light of the “real military dangers” 
that existed during World War II. 323 U.S. 214, 216, 223 (1944). While this 
decision has been extensively criticized, it is a noticeable example of the Court 
upholding a law that directly impacts a suspect class. Id. More commonly, 
however, equal protection cases involve the Court striking down legislation 
that impermissibly affects a suspect class. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 
U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating a Virginia statute that prohibited inter-racial 
marriages because the law had no legitimate purpose that necessarily justified 
its existence). 
37 GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 630. Race is the principal suspect class 
that always requires strict scrutiny. See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429 
(1984) (reversing a state court custody decision that took away custody rights 
from a mother after she married an African American); McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (invalidating a Florida statute that proscribed the 
cohabitation of interracial married couples); Yick Wo. v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 
356 (1886) (reversing the decision to imprison a Chinese alien who was 
refused a permit for operating his laundry because the administration of the 
law was purposely directed at a class of people). The right to vote has been 
referred to as a fundamental right requiring strict scrutiny. See Kramer v. 
Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (invalidating a law that 
required voters in a school district election to own real property in the district 
or have children enrolled in the district because the statute did not promote a 
compelling state interest); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 
(1966) (establishing that a poll tax is unconstitutional because it infringes upon 
the fundamental right to vote). 
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felony disenfranchisement in Richardson v. Ramirez.38 In 
Ramirez, California ex-felons challenged a state law that denied 
them the right to vote.39 The plaintiffs claimed that the statute 
violated the Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.40 Although this argument was accepted by the 
California Supreme Court,41 the United States Supreme Court 
rejected it, determining that the strict scrutiny required by section 
one of the Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to ex-felons 
because section two permits states to restrict convicted criminals’ 
right to vote.42 Section two provides that a state’s representation 
may be reduced if the vote is denied to qualified individuals, 
excluding those who have participated in “rebellion, or other 
crime.”43 The Court interpreted this section as permitting the 
state to deny ex-felons the right to vote.44 Therefore, equal 
protection did not apply to ex-felons because section two is an 
“affirmative sanction” of criminal behavior.45 This decision 
                                                          
38 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
39 Id. at 26. The ex-felons challenged both Article XX, section 11 of the 
California Constitution, which required the adoption of laws that exclude 
convicted persons from voting, and sections 310, 321, 383, 389, 390, 14240, 
and 14246 of the California Elections Code as the sections that enforce the 
mandate of the constitution. Id. 
40 Id. at 33. Ramirez claimed that California must articulate a compelling 
state interest in order to justify the denial of the right to vote by the class of 
ex-felons. Id. According to Ramirez, because the state could not find such an 
interest, the statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing 
disenfranchisement violated the Equal Protection clause. Id. 
41 Ramirez v. Brown, 507 P.2d 1345 (1973). The California court 
examined whether the statutory scheme disenfranchising ex-felons was the 
least burdensome way the state could regulate the electoral system, and 
concluded that it was not. Id. at 212. Instead, the court determined that 
disenfranchisement was not necessary for the state to effectively regulate the 
voting process. Id. at 216. 
42 “[W]hen the vote at any election . . . is denied . . . or in any way 
abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of 
representation therein shall be reduced.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 
(emphasis added); Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54. 
43 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
44 Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54. 
45 Id. 
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drastically limited the ability to challenge disenfranchisement 
laws on the basis of the Equal Protection Clause, and subsequent 
circuit court cases reflect this futility.46 
Although the Supreme Court ruled that denying the right to 
vote to ex-felons is permissible under section two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment,47 the Court thereafter invalidated a 
disenfranchisement law in Hunter v. Underwood.48 In Hunter, the 
Court found that two factors must be met to establish that a 
disenfranchisement law violates the Equal Protection clause.49 
First, the plaintiff must prove that the disputed law was 
conceived and written with racially discriminatory intent.50 
                                                          
46 See, e.g., Howard v. Gilmore, 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding 
that the plaintiff did not establish that the state’s act intended to or had the 
effect of denying the right to vote based on race); Cotton v. Fordice, 157 F.3d 
388 (5th Cir. 1998) (dismissing felon’s claim that Mississippi’s Constitution 
unfairly denied him the right to vote because the constitution was amended 
since its original enactment, removing any discriminatory intent); Baker v. 
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1995) (affirming lower court’s decision to 
dismiss ex-felons’ complaint that the New York election law 
disproportionately deprived blacks of their right to vote); Buckner v. Schaefer, 
36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994) (stating that there was no evidence that a 
Maryland statute disenfranchising ex-felons was intended to or is being applied 
in a discriminatory manner); Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1983) 
(declaring that a state may rationally decide to disenfranchise ex-felons); 
Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that the state 
classifications disenfranchising ex-felons bear a rational relationship to the 
state’s interest in limiting the franchise to responsible voters). 
47 Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 55. 
48 471 U.S. 222 (1985). 
49 Id. at 225. 
50 Id. Discriminatory intent exists when a court finds that discrimination 
is a substantial or motivating factor in the adoption of the statute. Underwood 
v. Hunter, 730 F.2d. 614, 617 (11th Cir. 1984). To determine whether 
discrimination was a motivating factor, a court must look at a variety of 
factors, including the historical background of the decision, legislative history 
and the impact of the decision on the affected group. Arlington Heights v. 
Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 525, 566-68 (1977); see also City of 
Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). The Supreme Court agreed with the 
lower court that the provision in Alabama’s 1901 Constitution that permitted 
disenfranchisement of any person who was convicted of any crime involving 
“moral turpitude” constituted an impermissibly broad category that included 
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Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate that such a law has a 
disproportionate impact on a protected class.51 If both of these 
factors are established, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection clause is violated.52 
Ultimately in Hunter the Supreme Court found that a 
provision of the Alabama Constitution that disenfranchised those 
convicted of misdemeanors of “moral turpitude” was originally 
adopted with intent to discriminate and had the intended impact 
on a protected class.53 The Court further stipulated that in order 
to violate the Equal Protection clause, disenfranchisement statutes 
must have been adopted solely to discriminate and would not 
have been adopted but for that intent.54 Therefore, the Court held 
that the provision violated the Equal Protection clause.55 
Hunter is significant in that it provides an Equal Protection 
                                                          
within its scope both felonies and misdemeanors. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 226. 
The framers believed these selected crimes were committed more frequently 
by blacks. Id. at 227. 
51 Id. A law has a disproportionate impact when it is demonstrated that 
one group in society is affected more than another. Id. For example, in Hunter 
the lower court found that section 182 of the Alabama Constitution 
disenfranchised ten times as many blacks as whites. Id. at 228. Laws that 
affect a protected or suspect class are always analyzed using the strict scrutiny 
standard. See supra note 37 (elaborating on protected and suspect classes). 
The Supreme Court indicated that the racial impact of the provision was not 
contested. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 228. 
52 Id. at 233. 
53 Id.; ALA. CONST. art. VIII, § 182 (1901). The Alabama Constitution 
denied the vote to those convicted of “any . . . crime involving moral 
turpitude,” which was later defined by the Alabama Supreme Court to mean 
an act that is “immoral in itself, regardless of the fact whether it is punishable 
by law.” Pippin v. State, 73 So. 340, 342 (1916) (quoting Fort v. Brinkley, 
112 S.W. 1084 (1908)); Hunter, 471 U.S. at 226. 
54 Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227. Using the standard articulated in Arlington 
Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 525 (1977), the Court required 
that proof is necessary to indicate that the questioned statute was enacted with 
the intent to discriminate and did not serve any other purpose than to 
discriminate. Hunter, 471 U.S. at 227. The Court also reiterated that once a 
plaintiff demonstrates that racial discrimination was a substantial factor in the 
creation of the law, the defense must then prove that the law would have been 
enacted even without this factor. Id. at 228. 
55 Id. at 224. 
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avenue to attack disenfranchisement laws.56 This case lessens the 
impact of Ramirez by demonstrating that disenfranchisement 
lawsuits can still be successful.57 Given the extensive 
discriminatory purpose in many of the states that continue to 
deny ex-felons access to the ballot box, the first factor in Hunter 
requiring proof of racially discriminatory intent should not be a 
difficult obstacle to face.58 
Few lawsuits, however, have been successful in applying the 
Hunter rule to similar statutes because the presence of 
discriminatory intent was ambiguous.59 In Cotton v. Fordice, the 
Fifth Circuit recognized that section 241 of the Mississippi 
Constitution was enacted in 1890 with discriminatory intent.60 
The court reasoned, however, that because the 
disenfranchisement provision was amended several times since 
1890 to remove sections that may have been intentionally 
discriminatory, the provision was not unconstitutional since the 
                                                          
56 Shapiro, supra note 2, at 548. 
57 Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 33. 
58 Shapiro, supra note 2, at 548. Shapiro notes that the history of 
disenfranchisement in the Southern states is especially apparent. Id. This is 
demonstrated by the results of constitutional conventions that took place after 
the Civil War. Id. at 541. Mississippi’s 1890 constitution is an example of 
intentional discrimination using disenfranchisement. See MISS. CONST. art. 
VII, § 241 (1890); supra note 9 (discussing section 241). Mississippi’s 
approach was mirrored at the constitutional conventions of other states, 
including South Carolina, Louisiana, Alabama, and Virginia. Shapiro, supra 
note 2, at 541. 
59 See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Canton, 947 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. 
Miss. 1995). In McLaughlin, the District Court for the Southern District of 
Mississippi declined to decide whether Section 241 of the Mississippi 
Constitution was enacted with racially discriminatory intent. Id. at 978. While 
the court conceded that this was possible, the issue was not fully addressed 
because the court had already decided that the plaintiff’s conviction of false 
pretenses was a misdemeanor, not a felony. Id. at 976. Because misdemeanors 
are not included among the class of crimes for which punishment may include 
disenfranchisement, Ramirez did not apply in this case and the issue of intent 
was irrelevant. Id. at 976-78. 
60 157 F.3d 388, 391 (5th Cir. 1998); see supra note 9 (discussing section 
241).  
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amendments were not adopted with the intent to discriminate.61 
Recently, in Howard v. Gilmore, the Fourth Circuit dismissed 
the possibility of discriminatory intent because the constitutional 
provision disenfranchising ex-felons existed before the enactment 
of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and the extension of 
the right to vote to blacks.62 Other cases reflect the tendency 
among courts to dismiss disenfranchisement cases with little or 
no discussion regarding discriminatory intent.63 
The outcomes of these cases reflect that while Hunter permits 
Equal Protection dialogue in some disenfranchisement cases, its 
scope is narrow and thus limited in utility. In conjunction with 
Ramirez, the standard set by Hunter significantly restricts 
constitutional argumentation.64 Therefore, litigation challenging 
disenfranchisement laws must focus on theories not confined by 
U.S. Constitutional claims.65 The ability to change such laws 
                                                          
61 Cotton, 157 F.3d at 391-92. Section 241 was amended in 1950 to 
remove “burglary” from the list of eligible crimes. Id. It was also amended in 
1968 to include “murder” and “rape,” crimes that historically were not 
considered “black crimes.” Id. Because the plaintiff did not offer any evidence 
that the amendments were enacted with discriminatory intent, the court 
assumed that they were not enacted with discriminatory intent. Id. 
62 205 F.3d 1333 (4th Cir. 2000). The court also based its decision on the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
giving express permission to the states to deny the right to vote to convicted 
criminals. Id.; see also supra note 41 and accompanying text (describing the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in Ramirez). 
63 See Buckner v. Schaefer, 36 F.3d 1091 (4th Cir. 1994) (explaining that 
plaintiffs provided no evidence that the statute in question was intended to 
discriminate); see also Owens v. Barnes, 711 F.2d 25 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting 
that a state could rationally decide to exclude convicted ex-felons from 
voting); Shepherd v. Trevino, 575 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir. 1979) (declaring that 
the classifications of ex-felons bore a rational relation to the state’s interest in 
limiting access to the franchise to responsible voters). 
64 Because Ramirez holds that the strict scrutiny required by section 1 
does not apply to ex-felons, the possibility of invalidating a law under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is limited to section 2. Ramirez, 418 U.S. at 54. This 
avenue is further restricted by the Hunter standard, however, and thus makes 
it more difficult to pursue disenfranchisement claims using the Constitution. 
See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 224. 
65 See infra Part I.C. (discussing state court litigation focusing on state 
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without a favorable Supreme Court ruling is a fundamental 
problem facing litigants. 
B. The Voting Rights Act 
Disenfranchised litigants have also attempted to use the 
Voting Rights Act in conjunction with the Equal Protection 
clause.66 Congress adopted the Voting Rights Act (“the Act”) in 
1965 to combat continuing racial discrimination in the South by 
enabling black voters to challenge existing voting barriers.67 The 
Southern states were targeted specifically because state and local 
governmental officials evaded the provisions of the Fifteenth 
Amendment by utilizing discriminatory devices such as literacy 
tests to prevent blacks from voting.68 
                                                          
constitutional claims). 
66 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (2001). 
67 GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 985-86. The Act prohibits voting 
qualifications that “result in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen 
of the United States to vote on account of race or color.” 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(2)(a). See Robert Barnes, Vote Dilution, Discriminatory Results, and 
Proportional Representation: What is the Appropriate Remedy for a Violation 
of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act?, 32 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1209 (1985) 
(stating that the main purpose of the Voting Rights Act was to provide a 
remedy for racially motivated obstruction of voting rights). 
68 GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 986. In particular, Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and North Carolina were 
singled out because of the continued existence of literacy tests or similar 
devices throughout the spring of 1965. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights 
Act: A Brief History, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 7, 18-19 
(Bernard Groffman & Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992). In addition to literacy 
tests, Southern states also created barriers such as grandfather clauses, 
property qualifications and character tests in order to prevent illiterate whites 
from being denied the right to vote. Charlotte Marx Harper, Lopez v. 
Monterey County: A Remedy Gone Too Far?, 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 435, 438 
(2000). For example, a grandfather clause entitled anyone who was a 
descendant of someone who was historically entitled to vote to be excused 
from taking the literacy test. Gregory A. Caldiera, Litigation, Lobbying, and 
the Voting Rights Bar, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 230, 232 
(Bernard Groffman & Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992). In addition, because 
less than two-thirds of blacks in many Southern states in 1890 knew how to 
read, requiring the completion of a registration form effectively prevented 
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The Supreme Court effectively limited the Act’s impact in 
City of Mobile v. Bolden, however, when it decided that 
discriminatory intent must be shown in order to establish a 
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or section two of the 
Voting Rights Act.69 Bolden was a class action initiated on behalf 
of the black residents of the city of Mobile, Alabama.70 The 
plaintiffs alleged that the town’s practice of electing the city 
commissioners at large by the city’s entire voting population 
unfairly diluted the strength of their vote in such elections and 
thus violated section two of the Act.71 The Court focused on prior 
cases that required plaintiffs to show that the disputed plan was 
“conceived or operated as [a] purposeful [device] to further 
racial . . . discrimination.”72 Because this standard was 
particularly difficult to prove, many pending lawsuits at the time 
of Bolden based on section two faced stiffer resistance from the 
local governments and were dropped.73 
In response to Bolden, Congress amended the Act in 1982 to 
create a “results” test that would specifically apply to voting 
                                                          
most blacks from voting. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311 
(1966). 
69 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act states that 
“[n]o voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice or 
procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a 
manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the right of any citizen of 
the United States to vote on account of race or color . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 
1973(2)(a) (2001). 
70 Bolden, 446 U.S. at 58. 
71 Id. at 58-60. 
72 Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1970); see also Kilgarlin v. 
Hill, 386 U.S. 120 (1967); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966); Fortson 
v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433 (1964). 
73 Frank R. Parker, The Impact of City of Mobile v. Bolden and 
Strategies and Legal Arguments for Voting Rights Cases in its Wake, in THE 
RIGHT TO VOTE: A ROCKEFELLER FOUNDATION REPORT 98, 111-12. 
(Rockefeller Foundation, ed., 1981). After Bolden, lawsuits on behalf of 
residents in other Alabama towns such as Jackson, Hattiesburg, Greenwood 
and Greenville were unsuccessful. Id.; see also Laughlin McDonald, The 1982 
Amendments of Section 2 and Minority Representation, in CONTROVERSIES IN 
MINORITY VOTING 66, 67 (Bernard Groffman & Chandler Davidson, eds., 
1992). 
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rights litigation.74 The amendment establishes that a reviewing 
court must look to the “totality of circumstances” present when 
considering a voting discrimination claim.75 By enacting a results 
test, Congress directed the courts to consider several “typical” 
factors listed in the Senate Judiciary Committee report addressing 
the 1982 amendment.76 The amendment’s supporters attempted to 
restore the moderate legal standard that existed prior to Bolden.77 
                                                          
74 Timothy G. O’Rourke, The 1982 Amendments and the Voting Rights 
Paradox, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 85, 98 (Bernard Groffman 
& Chandler Davidson, eds., 1992). A results test requires that a challenge 
based on the Voting Rights Act must prove discriminatory results only without 
requiring proof of intent. Davidson, supra note 68, at 39. 
75 42 U.S.C. § 1973(2)(b). 
A violation . . . is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to 
nomination or election in the State or political subdivision are not 
equally open to participation by members of a class of citizens 
protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity 
than other members of the electorate to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice. 
Id.; see also GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 990 (discussing the totality of the 
circumstances standard in section 2 of the Act). 
76 Voting Rights Act Extension Report of the S. Comm. on the J., 97th 
Cong. 28-9 (1982); O’Rourke, supra note 74, at 99. The report listed several 
factors. 
[A] history of official racial discrimination in voting; racially 
polarized voting; practices such as majority-vote rules that may 
enhance the opportunity for discrimination; a discriminatory slating 
process; socioeconomic disparities that impede minority political 
participation; racial appeals in campaigns; and the lack of minority 
electoral success. Two additional factors included the absence of 
official responsiveness to minority group interests and a tenuous 
policy in support of the challenged voting practice. 
Id. (internal quotations omitted). Congress derived these factors from White v. 
Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973), in which the Supreme Court declared that 
minority groups must be given equal opportunity to vote and declared unlawful 
practices that had the effect of creating unequal opportunities based on race. 
McDonald, supra note 73, at 66. This effect could be shown by the presence 
of any of the factors; evidence of intent was not necessary. Id.; see supra note 
75 for the text of the Act. 
77 McDonald, supra note 73, at 66. Before Bolden, the Court held in 
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Although the amendment was intended to ease a plaintiff’s 
difficulties in meeting the intent standard, few disenfranchisement 
cases have been successful since it was passed.78 Even when ex-
felons refer to the Act to claim that disenfranchisement denies 
them the right to vote based on race, state and federal courts still 
require them to prove both specific discriminatory intent and 
impact in order to invalidate the law.79 Therefore, because courts 
have disregarded congressional reasoning behind the amendment, 
the changes have virtually no impact on the legal standard.80 
Wesley v. Collins was the first federal case to address the 
1982 amendment.81 In Wesley, the Sixth Circuit rejected a 
disenfranchised felon’s claim that the Tennessee Voting Rights 
Act unfairly denied him the right to vote.82 While the Wesley 
court conceded that the 1982 amendment was designed so that 
“the challenging party need not prove discriminatory intent to 
establish a violation,” it held that the plaintiff failed to 
demonstrate that the “totality of the circumstances” resulted in a 
violation of the Act.83 Tennessee’s history of racial discrimination 
                                                          
White v. Regester that states may not deny minorities an equal opportunity to 
vote. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). Unequal opportunity may be proven by any of a 
number of factors, see supra note 76, and specific proof of intent was not 
necessary. Id. at 67. Therefore, the standard in place pre-Bolden was easier 
for Voting Rights Act litigants to prove. Id. 
78 See supra note 63 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases 
with ineffective Voting Rights Act claims). 
79 Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996); Wesley v. Collins, 791 
F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). See infra Part I.B (discussing federal cases that 
evaluated the application of the 1982 amendment to felony disenfranchisement 
claims). 
80 See supra note 63 (providing examples of cases where the legal 
standard has remained the same). 
81 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). 
82 TENN. CODE ANN. § 2-19-143 (1981). The Tennessee Voting Rights 
Act of 1981 provides that “any person who has been convicted of an infamous 
crime in Tennessee . . . shall not be permitted to register to vote or to vote in 
any election.” Id.; see also Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1257. 
83 Wesley, 791 F.2d at 1260. The court reasoned that the lower court’s 
emphasis on the evidence of the effects of past discrimination was misplaced 
because this factor alone is not sufficient to constitute a violation of the Voting 
Rights Act. Id. 
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was not sufficient to establish a violation despite evidence that the 
state’s Voting Rights Act disproportionately affected blacks.84 
Instead, the court declared that the rationale behind the law was 
both legitimate and compelling, based on the holding in Ramirez 
that criminal disenfranchisement is constitutionally permissible.85 
Therefore, even though Wesley contains an acknowledgment of 
Congress’ attempt to make the standard more lenient, its outcome 
demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit continues to adhere to the 
heightened intent standard set by Bolden.86 
Courts in other circuits have also refused to utilize the results 
standard.87 This indicates that congressional directives supportive 
of modifying disenfranchisement laws may ultimately have little 
value when faced with court decisions that reflect the current 
Supreme Court’s tendency to limit congressional power.88 
                                                          
84 Id. The court refers to the district court’s finding that the historical 
presence of racial discrimination in Tennessee continues to have effects in the 
present day, including the resulting disproportionate impact on blacks who are 
convicted of felonies at a significantly higher rate than whites. Id. at 1260. 
85 Id. at 1261. To justify the state’s rationale, the court cited the Lockean 
theory that one who breaks society’s laws is authorizing the government to 
take away certain rights, including voting rights. Id.; see supra note 10 
(discussing the social contract theory of John Locke). The court also 
emphasized that it is reasonable for a state to decide to take away the voting 
privilege from those who commit serious crimes. Id. at 1261-62. The act of 
disenfranchisement is taken against an individual as a result of their 
participation in a preascertained, proscribed criminal act, rather than against a 
group of citizens as a whole and thus does not violate equal protection, 
according to the court. Id. at 1262. 
86 446 U.S. 55 (1980); 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986). Some believe the 
plaintiff’s fulfillment of both disparate racial impact and historical 
discrimination should have been sufficient to constitute a Voting Rights Act 
violation. Shapiro, supra note 2, at 550; see also Harvey, supra note 17, at 
1186 (questioning the Wesley court’s claim that plaintiffs suing under section 2 
of the Voting Rights Act must demonstrate that discriminatory intent was 
present in the enactment of the disputed statute, which contradicts the purpose 
of the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act). 
87 Jones v. Edgar, 3 F.Supp.2d 979 (C.D. Ill. 1998); Farrakhan v. 
Locke, 987 F. Supp. 1304 (E.D. Wa 1997). 
88 See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In City of 
Boerne, the Court held that Congress does not have the power to define 
substantive aspects of the Constitution. Id. at 519. This case restricts federal 
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Nevertheless, potential for reform on the federal circuit level 
is still a possibility. In the Second Circuit, felons brought a 
lawsuit challenging New York’s election law that denied inmates 
and paroled felons the vote based on the results test.89 The 
inmates’ original claim was dismissed by the district court of the 
Southern District of New York.90 On appeal, five judges voted to 
allow felons to pursue Voting Rights Act claims, stating that 
“[w]hile a State may choose to disenfranchise some, all or none 
of its ex-felons based on legitimate concerns, it may not do so 
based upon distinctions that have the effect, whether intentional 
or not, of disenfranchising felons because of their race.”91 
Furthermore, the judges in support of the plaintiffs’ claims 
minimized the need to demonstrate specific past discrimination in 
the state in order to establish a Voting Rights Act claim.92 
Instead, the judges classified it as one of several factors to be 
considered.93 A split among the judges resulted in the lawsuit’s 
                                                          
statutes that may have the effect of granting or lessening rights granted by the 
Bill of Rights. Id. “Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by 
changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to enforce,’ not the 
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.” Id. Because 
the 1982 Voting Rights Act amendment lessens the standard required by 
section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in voting rights cases, it is possible 
that the Court may hold that utilization of the results-oriented standard is 
unconstitutional. Id. at 525. See also GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 525 (13th 
ed. Supp. 2000) (noting that Boerne is the first in a line of cases that suggest 
“that Congress must demonstrate a clear justification for the exercise of its 
civil rights enforcement power against the states”). Thus, congressional 
attempts to remedy disenfranchisement may not be useful in changing laws. 
Id. 
89 Baker v. Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996). The felons brought suit to 
challenge N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-106(2)-(5) (2002). Baker, 85 F.3d at 920. The 
case was originally filed as Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). 
90 Baker v. Cuomo, 58 F.3d 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). At trial, the felons’ 
action was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be 
granted. Id. A panel of the trial court reversed this decision. Id. The 
defendants sought review in the Court of Appeals. Id. 
91 Baker, 85 F.3d at 937 (emphasis added). 
92 Id. at 937-38. 
93 Id. at 938. Judge Feinberg used literacy tests as a comparative 
example. Id. at 937. When the Court upheld the ban on literacy tests in 
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dismissal without precedential effect.94 Nevertheless, this split 
demonstrates that results-test arguments can be influential.95 
The reasoning in Baker favoring the results-test rationale 
indicates that the 1982 Amendment to the Voting Rights Act does 
not unacceptably push the limits of Congress’ enforcement power 
of the Equal Protection Clause into unconstitutional boundaries.96 
Despite the lack of a clear victory, Baker demonstrates that the 
results test of the Act will be influential in changing felon 
disenfranchisement laws.97 While several constitutional issues 
remain in question,98 this method is not completely devoid of 
                                                          
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), it did so without proof of 
congressional violations in every state. Baker, 85 F.3d at 937. 
94 Baker, 85 F.3d at 921; see also Shapiro, supra note 17, at 3. Ten 
judges on the Second Circuit sat en banc and were evenly divided as to the 
merits of the case. Id. Because there was no majority opinion, the lower 
court’s order to dismiss the ex-felons’ claims was affirmed. Id. 
95 See Baker, 85 F.3d at 934 (Feinberg, J., separate opinion). Judge 
Feinberg’s alternative view represented the concerns of the five judges who 
voted to allow plaintiffs to argue that the results test set out in section 2 of the 
1982 Amendment negated the necessity of demonstrating discriminatory 
intent. Id. These judges constitute half of the panel that heard the case. Id. 
96 Baker, 85 F.3d at 937. Judge Feinberg wrote, “I see no persuasive 
reason, in view of Hunter, why Congress may not use its enforcing power 
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment 
to bar racially discriminatory results, as it did in the Voting Rights Act.” Id. 
97 Id. The fact that half of the judges sitting to hear Baker on the Second 
Circuit agreed that such a claim may be made indicates a possibility that like-
minded judges exist in other circuits, or that judges are gradually becoming 
more favorable toward disenfranchisement cases based on the 1982 
amendments to the Voting Rights Act. Id. 
98 Id. Aside from issues of the scope of congressional power referenced 
by City of Boerne, the Voting Rights Act is also tainted by the applicability of 
the plain statement rule, which requires an explicit statement of intent from 
Congress when altering its usual balance with the states. Id. at 938. The 
question remains whether this rule applies to the Voting Rights Act. Id. Judge 
Feinberg argued that application of the Voting Rights Amendment to state 
disenfranchisement does not upset the balance because the Act follows in the 
path of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, which were specific 
expansions of federal power. Id. Furthermore, the Court declined to apply the 
plain statement rule to section 2 of the Voting Rights Act in Chisom v. 
Roemer, 501 U.S. 380 (1991). Baker, 85 F.3d at 937. 
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promise.99 
C. State Court Litigation 
Chances for success in felony disenfranchisement lawsuits 
may be greater within the state court system. State court lawsuits 
attacking disenfranchisement laws have taken various 
approaches.100 Some claims have focused on the irregular 
application of laws to particular segments of the felony 
population.101 Other lawsuits have made broader arguments based 
on the unconstitutionality of specific provisions of state 
constitutions.102 
Mixon v. Commonwealth is a key example of a successful 
disenfranchisement lawsuit focusing on specific groups within the 
disenfranchised population.103 In Mixon, ex-felons who had 
completed their sentences challenged provisions of 
                                                          
99 See Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fl. 2002). A Florida 
federal appeals court will have a chance to create positive change when they 
review a recent decision made by the Southern District of Florida. Id. Johnson 
is an action brought by a group of ex-felons on behalf of all convicted ex-
felons in Florida contending that the state’s disenfranchisement laws violate 
the First, Fourteenth, Fifteenth and Twenty-Fourth Amendments as well as 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Johnson, 214 F. 
Supp. 2d at 4, 5. On July 18, 2002, the Florida District Court granted 
summary judgment to the defendants on all counts. Id. at 31. The Brennan 
Center for Justice, the organization representing the plaintiffs, is planning to 
appeal. See Press Release, Brennan Center for Justice, Brennan Center 
Statement on Decision in Johnson v. Bush (July 17, 2002), available at 
http://www.brennancenter.org/presscenter/ pressrelease-2002-0618.html. 
100 See, e.g., Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2000); Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321 (N.H. 2000). 
101 See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 453 (declaring that the state unlawfully denied 
ex-felons who were imprisoned within the past five years the right to register 
to vote). 
102 Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321 (N.H. 2000) (holding that New 
Hampshire’s felon disenfranchisement statutes did not violate plaintiff’s right 
to vote under the New Hampshire Constitution); Emery v. State, 580 P.2d 445 
(Mont. 1978) (declaring that the Montana Constitution and state statutes do not 
unconstitutionally deny convicted ex-felons the right to vote). 
103 759 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000). 
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Pennsylvania’s Voter Registration Act, which prohibited ex-
felons released from prison for less than five years from 
registering to vote.104 The court found no rational basis existed to 
distinguish ex-felons who had not registered to vote before 
serving prison sentences from those who had registered prior to 
their prison terms and were, therefore, permitted to vote upon 
release.105 
The Mixon decision has both negative and positive 
implications for felony disenfranchisement.106 The court 
reaffirmed the principle set forth in Ramirez that felony 
disenfranchisement does not violate the Constitution.107 The 
decision to invalidate the unconstitutional provision of 
Pennsylvania’s Voter Registration Act, however, resulted in the 
restoration of voting rights for thousands of ex-felons.108 The fact 
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was willing to declare some 
voting restrictions invalid is encouraging, and this case is a 
helpful model for ex-felons in other states. Because this decision 
focuses on a narrow group of individuals, however, it has limited 
applicability to general disenfranchisement claims.109 
                                                          
104 Id. at 451; Pennsylvania Voter Registration Act, 25 PA. CONS. STAT. 
§ 961.101-.5109 (1995). 
105 Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. See supra Part I.A (explaining the rational 
basis test). 
106 Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. The court stated, “[A]lthough a state may not 
only disenfranchise all convicted ex-felons it may also distinguish among 
them, but the distinction must be such that it is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.” Id. This illustrates that, while the court’s use of 
Ramirez limits the number of ex-felons who are affected by the decision, the 
fact that the court decides that the Voter Registration Act provision was not 
rationally related to a legitimate state interest improves the status of many 
formerly disenfranchised ex-felons. Id. 
107 759 A.2d at 449. 
108 THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 2. 
109 The result in this case was based on the lack of a rational basis to 
justify denying the vote to ex-felons who had not registered before their 
sentence while permitting those who had already registered to vote. Mixon, 
759 A.2d at 451. The court relied upon the Third Circuit decision in Owens v. 
Barnes that prohibits distinguishing among disenfranchised convicted felons if 
the distinction is not rationally related to a legitimate state interest. 711 F.2d 
25 (3d Cir. 1983); see also Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. This rationale is 
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The second, broader approach to disenfranchisement lawsuits 
focuses on violations of state constitutional provisions.110 This 
approach would be more fruitful when attacking a 
disenfranchisement statute in its entirety.111 The use of state 
constitutional analysis to confront disenfranchisement laws has 
been infrequently utilized, and, therefore, this approach has the 
potential to restore voting rights to millions.112 This is especially 
true in states that continue to disenfranchise ex-felons after 
completion of parole.113 The most prominent, albeit unsuccessful, 
                                                          
important for specific groups of future ex-felons who are denied the vote while 
other similarly situated ex-felons are not because of a particular factor that 
occurs in some ex-felons but not in others and does not meet the rational basis 
test. Id. An example would be disenfranchising blue-eyed ex-felons but not 
their brown-eyed counterparts. Id. In order to use this case in other 
disenfranchisement lawsuits, a specific factor must be present that would apply 
only to a certain percentage of ex-felons who are affected by the arbitrary 
distinction. Id. This type of argument may or may not result in ending 
disenfranchisement for a significant number of ex-felons, depending on the 
size of the particular group affected and the frequency with which the 
irrational distinction is made. Therefore, Mixon may not be useful in broader 
disenfranchisement claims. 
110 See infra note 116 and accompanying text (discussing a New 
Hampshire case that asserted that the state’s felon disenfranchisement statutes 
violated the state constitution); see also Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321 
(N.H. 2000). 
111 See Mixon, 759 A.2d at 451. In contrast with the result in Mixon, 
where only the voting rights of those ex-felons who had not registered to vote 
before committing a felony were restored, a successful attack on a 
disenfranchisement statute or constitutional provision using a constitutional 
argument would restore voting rights to a larger percentage of ex-felons 
because the result would apply to all ex-felons. Id. 
112 See Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321, 323 (N.H. 2000) (overruling 
the lower court’s declaration that New Hampshire’s felon disenfranchisement 
statutes violated the state’s constitution). State constitutional analysis can be 
applied to the felon population as a whole, rather than specific groups who 
have particular grievances that do not apply to all ex-felons. Thus, this type of 
lawsuit would have the most impact on the greatest number of ex-felons. 
113 FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 7. In Alabama, Florida, 
Mississippi, Virginia and Wyoming, more than four percent of their respective 
adult populations are disenfranchised even after completion of parole. Id. A 
repeal of disenfranchisement laws in these states would drastically increase the 
nation’s population eligible to vote. Id. 
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attempt to achieve such a result occurred in New Hampshire.114 
In Fischer v. Governor, the New Hampshire Supreme Court 
examined whether the state felon disenfranchisement statutes 
violated the state constitution.115 The court used a reasonableness 
standard to evaluate the state’s interest in limiting the franchise in 
relation to the plaintiff’s interest in obtaining voting rights.116 The 
court evaluated the state’s argument that by committing a crime, 
the felon violated “the social contract” that creates the foundation 
of a democracy.117 In determining this rationale to be valid, the 
court declared that it is not unreasonable to expect society to 
exclude such individuals from “voting for those who create and 
enforce the laws.”118 
Although the plaintiff in Fischer was not successful in re-
enfranchising felons, this result should not completely dissuade 
other plaintiffs from utilizing state constitutions in 
disenfranchisement challenges.119 The reasonableness standard 
used by Fischer is subjective, and the same application in another 
state’s court may lead to a different result.120 This method’s 
utility has not been fully explored, and it may be particularly 
                                                          
114 See Fischer v. Governor, 749 A.2d 321 (N.H. 2000). 
115 749 A.2d 321; N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607-A:2 (1986) (prohibiting 
ex-felons from voting in elections); RSA 654:5 (1996) (stating that ex-felons’ 
civil rights as listed in the New Hampshire Code section 607-A:2 are forfeited 
as a result of the conviction); N.H. CONST. part I art. 11 (amended 1984). 
116 749 A.2d at 329. 
117 Id.; see supra note 10 (discussing the Lockean theory of the social 
contract). 
118 Id. According to the court, the legislature acted properly given that 
disenfranchisement is a reasonable reaction to the commission of a felony. Id. 
at 330. The court attempts to provide additional examples of the legislature’s 
erudite discretion by stating that only criminals convicted of the “most serious 
offenses” are disenfranchised. Id. 
119 See Fischer v. Governor, No. 98 E402 (N.H. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 
1998). The ruling by the lower court that the disenfranchisement statutes 
violated the New Hampshire Constitution is an indication that there are some 
judges who are willing to consider state constitutional challenges to 
disenfranchisement. Id. Because a state court decision is not binding on 
another state’s judicial system, the result in Fischer is merely persuasive. 
120 Fischer, 749 A.2d at 329. 
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successful in states where ex-felons do not have the right to 
vote.121 When using the state constitution, litigants have more 
latitude in arguing constitutional violations if the focus is on the 
reasonableness of preventing ex-felons from voting rather than on 
the reasonableness of preventing felons currently in prison from 
voting.122 This argument would be favored by a court willing to 
expand the rights of individuals who have completed their 
sentence and are subsequently contributing to society in a positive 
manner.123 
II.  LEGISLATIVE APPROACHES TO DISENFRANCHISEMENT 
Recently, legislative proposals have addressed 
disenfranchisement more substantially than the court system.124 
On the federal level, legislators have begun to address the issue 
by introducing legislation in Congress.125 State legislatures have 
been active in establishing task forces to contemplate changes to 
disenfranchisement statutes.126 Additionally, several state 
                                                          
121 See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 1, at 3. These include 
Alabama, Arizona, Delaware, Florida, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, 
Mississippi, Nevada and Wyoming. Id. 
122 See, e.g., Mixon v. Commonwealth, 759 A.2d 442 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
2000) (declaring invalid a denial of voting rights to certain ex-felons while 
establishing that no violation occurred in the disenfranchisement of currently 
incarcerated ex-felons). Courts seem to be more willing to find violations of 
state constitutions in cases involving ex-felons who have completed their 
sentences rather than in cases involving current prisoners. Id. at 448. 
123 See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 10, at 17 (describing the story of 
Rosetta Meeks, convicted of a drug felony in 1993 and permanently barred 
from voting in Florida despite her efforts to contribute to her community, 
including teaching computer skills to low-income people). 
124 See, e.g., H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 495, 2001 (Md. 
2001); S.B. 208, 1999 (Fla. 1999); A.J.R 6, 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999). 
125 H.R. 906. Representative Conyers introduced this bill “[t]o secure the 
Federal voting rights of persons who have been released from incarceration.” 
Id. Representatives Martin Frost of Texas, Charles Rangel of New York and 
Sheila Jackson-Lee of Texas were among those who also supported this bill. 
Id. 
126 Green, supra note 16, at B1. The Virginia State Crime Commission 
created a task force in June 2001 to study the restoration of civil rights for ex-
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legislators have proposed state constitutional amendments.127 
A.  Federal Legislation 
The most recent federal legislation dealing with felony 
disenfranchisement is H.R. 906, presented to the House of 
Representatives in 1999 by Michigan Representative John 
Conyers.128 The primary objective of this bill, referred to as the 
Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, is to restore 
the federal voting rights of ex-felons.129 The Act authorizes the 
Attorney General to initiate declaratory or injunctive relief 
against states that violate its provisions.130 It also entitles those 
who would be affected by a violation of the Act to provide notice 
to the chief election official of the state.131 Although this Act died 
in the Judiciary Committee, the issues raised in a congressional 
subcommittee hearing on the Act provide insight into future 
difficulties similar bills might face.132 
One of these issues addresses whether Congress’ supervisory 
power over federal elections is sufficient to justify federal 
                                                          
felons. Id. In Maryland, the state legislature formed the Task Force to Study 
Repealing the Disenfranchisement of Convicted Ex-felons. H.R. 495, 2001 
(Md. 2001). 
127 ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 6. In 1999, Florida Senator James 
Hargrett introduced a bill that would lift a constitutional requirement that ex-
felons initiate the restoration of their civil rights in order to vote or hold 
office. S.B. 208, 1999 (Fla. 1999); see also ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, 
at 6. Also in 1999, Nevada Assemblyman Wendell Williams proposed a 
constitutional amendment that would automatically restore the right to vote to 
ex-felons. A.J.R 6, 70th Sess. (Nev. 1999); see also ALLARD & MAUER, 
supra note 4, at 8. 
128 H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999). 
129 Id. Shortly after its introduction, the bill was referred to the House 
Judiciary Committee and then to the Subcommittee on the Constitution. 
ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12. 
130 H.R. 906; ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12. 
131 H.R. 906; ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12. 
132 Civic Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999: Hearing on H.R. 
906 Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearing]; see also ALLARD & 
MAUER, supra note 4, at 12. 
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interference in an area traditionally left to the states.133 Gillian 
Metzger, a staff attorney at the Brennan Center for Justice at 
New York University School of Law, argued at the subcommittee 
hearing that such questions should not prevent the passage of the 
1999 Act.134 Metzger asserted that the Elections Clause of Article 
I, Section 4 of the Constitution gives Congress very broad power 
to regulate federal elections.135 She also maintained that the Act 
represents a congressional policy judgment regarding felony 
disenfranchisement.136 These policy considerations are validly 
enforced through the Elections Clause, which requires states to 
defer to Congress regarding the conduct of federal elections.137 
                                                          
133 U.S. CONST. art. I., § 4. The Elections Clause gives power to the 
state legislatures to prescribe “the times, places and manner of holding 
elections for Senators and Representatives,” but it also permits Congress to 
“make or alter such regulations.” Id. Some disenfranchisement activists have 
indicated that this clause may give Congress the authority to establish 
qualifications for federal elections; however, it has never been directly 
addressed by the Supreme Court. See ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 12 
(outlining the comments made by Gillian Metzger, a staff attorney for the 
Brennan Center, at a Subcommittee on the Constitution hearing held on 
October 21, 1999). 
134 Hearing, supra note 132, at 47 (testimony of Gillian Metzger, Brennan 
Center staff attorney). 
135 Id. at 56. According to Metzger, the Elections Clause was used as the 
rationale giving Congress the authority to enact the Federal Election Campaign 
Act. Id. Additionally, the Supreme Court affirmed that Congress has a broad 
power to “safeguard the legitimacy of federal elections” when the Court 
upheld the Corrupt Practices Act, which regulates contributions and 
expenditures made to influence the selection of presidential electors. Id. 
136 Id. at 48. Metzger stated that H.R. 906 addresses existing disparities 
between the states regarding felon participation in federal elections, and 
represents a judgment that “such disparities in citizens’ fundamental rights 
based on the happenstance of geography are unwarranted, and threaten the 
integrity and legitimacy of federal government.” Id. 
137 Id. at 47-49. Metzger dismissed an opposing argument that the 
Qualifications Clause of Article I, Section 2 (requiring that the qualifications 
of the voters in Senate and House elections be the same as qualifications for 
voters in the most numerous branch of the state legislature) negates any 
implication that Congress has the power to set qualifications for voters in 
federal elections. Id. Metzger stated that the intent of the Founders in writing 
the Qualifications Clause was to prevent states from enacting laws that result 
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Additionally, Metzger argued that Congress’ enforcement powers 
under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments provide the 
authority to adopt the Act since the existence of discriminatory 
intent and impact in disenfranchisement laws violate both 
amendments.138 
In light of the holding in City of Boerne v. Flores, however, 
the Court likely would have invalidated the 1999 Act.139 Because 
this bill would require states to permit ex-felons to vote in all 
federal elections, some states would be required to change their 
voting procedures and qualifications.140 This would raise issues 
regarding the scope of Congress’ power to enforce federal laws 
in the states.141 
                                                          
in some citizens being eligible to vote in state elections but not in 
congressional elections. Id. 
138 Id. at 49, 55. The right to vote is a fundamental right that is protected 
by the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, giving Congress the authority to 
address state laws that impede protected groups’ ability to vote. Id.; see supra 
Part I.A (discussing the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause and 
its impact on felony disenfranchisement lawsuits); see also supra note 36 and 
accompanying text (discussing “fundamental rights”). Metzger states that 
criminal disenfranchisement provisions have been enacted to exclude black 
voters and continue to have a “substantially greater impact on minorities, 
particularly African-American men.” Hearing, supra note 132, at 55; see 
supra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of 
“disproportionate impact”). Metzger states that Congress has the power to 
adopt remedial legislation even if it prohibits some conduct that is not 
unconstitutional. Hearing, supra note 132, at 55. She points to Congress’ 
power to ban literacy tests, even though such tests may not by themselves 
violate the Constitution. Id.; see supra Part I.B (discussing the historical 
factors leading up to the Voting Rights Act and the subsequent use of the Act 
in felony disenfranchisement legislation); see also supra note 68 (discussing 
literacy tests and other restrictions on voting). 
139 521 U.S. 507 (1997); see supra note 88 and accompanying text 
(describing the current Court’s reluctance to endorse congressional actions that 
expand the federal government’s power). 
140 H.R. 906, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999). States that do not permit ex-felons 
to vote in any election would have to implement procedures so that the ex-
felons have access to federal elections even if they are still prohibited from 
voting in the state elections. See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 4; see supra notes 
12-14 (listing the potentially affected states). 
141 GUNTHER, supra note 31, at 984-85. The scope of the federal 
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Additionally, a federal disenfranchisement act faces practical 
concerns of implementation. If a law were enacted to prohibit the 
disenfranchisement of ex-felons in federal elections, state election 
officials would be faced with the logistical problem of separating 
state and federal ballots.142 Moreover, experts doubt that sponsors 
of the act would be able to create a broad coalition sufficient to 
pass the bill, given the limited amount of national public 
awareness and support for re-enfranchisement.143 Nevertheless, 
while disenfranchisement may not be a favored political issue, 
the involvement of prominent legislators to modify the laws on a 
federal level may create a more receptive atmosphere.144 While 
                                                          
government’s power to create laws that declare certain practices unlawful even 
if the Court has not found them to be unconstitutional depends upon whether 
such laws are determined by the Court to be “remedial.” Id. Remedial laws 
are those that “provide enforcement mechanisms to implement judicially 
declared rights.” Id. at 984. The remedial nature of the 1999 Act may be 
assessed by the standard set by City of Boerne, which requires a high level of 
justification for congressional action taken against the states. Id. at 99. City of 
Boerne stated that “[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional 
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress’ enforcement power even if in 
the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes 
into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.’” 521 
U.S. at 518 (internal citations omitted). Justice Kennedy further stated that 
congressional legislation prohibiting literacy tests and similar requirements 
enacted to address racial discrimination in voting was upheld under the 
Fifteenth Amendment’s enforcement clause. Id. Because City of Boerne also 
stressed that the enforcement power is remedial and does not permit Congress 
to decide what is an impermissible constitutional violation, however, the 
question whether Congress has the power to force states to re-enfranchise ex-
felons for federal elections depends upon whether that power is considered 
merely remedial in nature or constitutes a substantive determination of 
constitutional violations. Id. at 519. 
142 Shapiro, supra note 17, at 4. 
143 Symposium, Constitutional Lawyering in the 21st Century, 
Enfranchising the Disenfranchised, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 249, 283 (2000). Melissa 
Saunders, professor at the University of North Carolina and Senior Counsel to 
the North Carolina Attorney General, points out that the issue was raised in 
the 2000 Democratic Presidential Primary debate and that neither candidate 
seemed to think that the disenfranchisement of ex-felons was a problem. Id. 
144 H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999). The 1999 congressional bill was 
introduced by Rep. Conyers and supported by other well-known 
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federal efforts are not particularly promising, local legislators 
may be more likely to change state disenfranchisement laws 
because they operate on a smaller, more flexible scale and are 
less likely to be scrutinized by the media and the public.145 
B. State Legislation 
Several states have passed constitutional amendments and 
bills repealing sections of disenfranchisement laws or easing 
restrictions on ex-felons.146 Additionally, some states have 
recognized the importance of this issue by creating task forces 
and committees to gather evidence to support modifying the 
existing laws.147 The increase in efforts made in states throughout 
the country as well as the presence of bi-partisan cooperation 
indicate that state legislation may be the most effective way to 
influence disenfranchisement laws.148 Given the increased 
                                                          
representatives, including Charles Rangel of New York, Maxine Waters of 
California and Jesse Jackson, Jr. of Illinois. Id. 
145 See infra Part II.B (outlining efforts made by state legislatures and 
governors to modify existing felony disenfranchisement laws). 
146 H.R. 5042, 2001 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2001) (restoring the 
voting rights of convicted ex-felons who are on probation); H.R. 126, 140th 
Gen. Assem. (Del. 2000) (amending the Delaware Constitution to permit 
persons convicted of certain felonies, excluding murder, sexual offenses, 
manslaughter and offenses against public administration including bribery, to 
vote after being pardoned or five years after the completion of their 
sentences); S.B. 204, 45th Leg., Reg. Sess. 2001 (N.M. 2001) (restoring the 
right to vote to convicted ex-felons who have satisfied all sentence conditions). 
See also Steve Miller, Rights Advocates and Democrats Seek Vote for Ex-
felons, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 9, 2001, at A3 (reporting that ten states have 
considered measures that would loosen felony voting restrictions during the 
end of 2000 through the first several months of 2001). 
147 See Green, supra note 16, at B1. In 2001, task forces were created in 
Maryland and Virginia to contemplate the voting rights of ex-felons. Id. In 
June 2001, the Virginia State Crime Commission created a task force to study 
the restoration of ex-felons’ civil rights. Id. The Maryland state legislature 
formed its own task force focusing on repealing the disenfranchisement of 
convicted ex-felons. H.B. 495, 415th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2001 (Md. 
2001). 
148 See supra Part II.A (discussing federal disenfranchisement action). 
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political viability of anti-disenfranchisement rationale in the 
states, this approach is likely to create a significant amount of 
change in a relatively short time period. 
Connecticut, Delaware and New Mexico have made 
significant changes to their disenfranchisement laws in recent 
years.149 In May 2000, Connecticut Governor John Rowland 
signed into law a bill restoring voting rights to ex-felons on 
probation.150 The bill was supported by several Republican 
leaders in the state legislature and was moved along by the 
lobbying efforts of a voting rights coalition that included civil 
rights groups as well as governmental agencies such as the 
Department of Corrections.151 Because this bill has only been in 
effect for less than a year, it is unknown exactly how much 
impact it has had on the status of felony disenfranchisement.152 
Nevertheless, because there are an estimated 37,000 ex-felons 
currently on probation in the state, the bill is likely to have a 
significant impact in Connecticut.153 
In June 2000, the Delaware General Assembly amended the 
state’s constitution to restore voting rights to certain convicted 
ex-felons five years after the completion of their sentence.154 The 
restoration does not apply to ex-felons convicted of murder, 
manslaughter, offenses against public administration involving 
bribery or improper influence, sexual offenses or abuse of 
office.155 
                                                          
Efforts underway on a state level have been vastly more successful than on the 
federal level. See supra Part II.A.  
149 ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 5 (describing restoration efforts 
in Connecticut and Delaware); Miles A. Rapoport, Restoring the Vote, AM. 
PROSPECT, Aug. 13, 2001, at 1314 (describing efforts in Connecticut and New 
Mexico). 
150 H.R. 5042, Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. 2001 (Conn. 2001); Rapoport, 
supra note 149. 
151 Rapoport, supra note 149. 
152 H.R. 5042, 2001 Leg. Jan. Sess. (Conn. 2001). 
153 Editorial, Ballot Box Blunder, CONN. L. TRIB., Apr. 23, 2001, at 22 
[hereinafter Ballot Box Blunder]. 
154 H.R. 126, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2000); ALLARD & MAUER, supra 
note 4, at 5. 
155 H.R. 126, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 2000). 
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In New Mexico, a bill passed in 2001 repealed the state’s 
lifetime ban on ex-felon voting.156 The bill eliminated the obstacle 
of obtaining a pardon in order to vote.157 Instead, voting rights 
are automatically restored once the ex-felon “has satisfactorily 
completed the terms of a suspended or deferred sentence,” or is 
“unconditionally discharged.”158 Supporters focused on the ban’s 
impact on the lower economic classes.159 
States such as Maryland, Virginia and Florida have also 
established special committees and task forces in order to address 
the problem of disenfranchisement.160 In Maryland, the state 
legislature passed a bill in May 2001 creating a task force to 
determine what modifications should be made to the state’s 
current statute, which permanently disenfranchises all ex-
felons.161 The measure was enacted after a similar bill passed by 
the House was unsuccessful in the Senate.162 The task force 
released a report on its findings in January 2002.163 This report 
                                                          
156 S.B. 204, 2001 45th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.M. 2001). 
157 S.B. 204 § 2. 
158 S.B. 204 § 2(A)(1)-(3); Rapoport, supra note 149. Ex-felons must 
obtain a certificate of discharge from the state Parole Board that demonstrates 
that they have met all of the terms of their sentence. S.U. Mahesh & David 
Miles, N.M. Legal Clashes Loom As Hidden-Gun Law Starts, ALBUQUERQUE 
J., July 1, 2001, at A1. This bill affects the voting status of 7,000 in New 
Mexico. Id. 
159 S.U. Mahesh, 2 Options Would Let Some Ex-felons Vote, 
ALBUQUERQUE J., Feb. 2, 2001, at A10. Senate President Pro Tem Richard 
Romero and Senator Manny Aragon, chairman of the Senate Rules Committee 
were the major forces behind the bill’s passage. Id. 
160 See H.R. 495, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001); Green, supra note 
16; Holly A. Heyser, Crime Panel to Study Voting Rights of Ex-felons, 
VIRGINIAN-PILOT, June 19, 2001, at B1; Hiaasen, supra note 16, at 7B. 
161 H.R. 495, 2001 Leg., 415th Sess. (Md. 2001). The act created a 
“Task Force to Study Repealing the Disenfranchisement of Convicted Ex-
felons in Maryland.” Id.; Rapoport, supra note 149. 
162 Matthew Mosk & Lori Montgomery, House Backs Restoring 
Criminals’ Voting Rights; Similar Measure Struck Down by Md. Senate, 
WASH. POST, Mar. 23, 2001, at B8. 
163 TASK FORCE TO STUDY REPEALING THE DISENFRANCHISEMENT OF 
CONVICTED FELONS IN MARYLAND, TASK FORCE REPORT (2002); Maryland: 
Progress on Ex-Felon Voting Rights, DEMOCRACY DISPATCHES (Demos: A 
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led to the creation of H.B.535, which the Assembly passed in the 
spring of 2002.164 The bill permits ex-felons to vote after they 
have completed “the court-ordered sentence.”165 The enactment 
of this bill demonstrates the significant influence task forces such 
as the one in Maryland can have on changing disenfranchisement 
laws. 
In Virginia, the State Crime Commission formed a task force 
to address the process of restoring voting rights to ex-felons.166 
Currently ex-felons must meet several requirements and 
ultimately gain a pardon from the governor.167 In June 2002, task 
force members announced their intention to amend the state 
constitution in order to implement an easier voting restoration 
process for ex-felons.168 The Commission’s proposal would 
create an alternate track established and monitored by the 
legislature, which would operate alongside the Governor’s 
independent power to restore voting rights.169 Virginia’s current 
governor, Mark R. Warner, is also developing his own proposal 
to make voting restoration more efficient.170 Once the change 
                                                          
Network for Ideas and Action, New York, N.Y), Feb. 15, 2002, available at 
http://www.demos-usa.org/Democracy_Reform/Dispatches16/. The task force 
found that about 135,700 citizens are denied the right to vote. Id.; see also 
Elaine Shen, Maryland’s Disenfranchisement of Ex-felons May be Easing, 
BALT. CHRON., Feb. 6, 2002, available at http://baltimorechronicle.com/ 
disenfranchisement_feb02.html. 
164 H.B. 535, 2002 Leg. 416th Sess. (Md. 2002). 
165 Id. The bill took effect on January 1, 2003. Id. Before this law was 
enacted, ex-felons could not qualify to vote until after the probation period had 
ended. Id. 
166 Green, supra note 16. The idea to form the task force was inspired by 
a 1996 study by the Richmond Times-Dispatch that revealed that almost 
270,000 felons had lost the right to vote in Virginia, as well as the national 
study completed by the Sentencing Project in 1998. Id.; see also FELLNER & 
MAUER, supra note 4, at 2; ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 2. 
167 Green, supra note 16. 
168 Christina Nuckols, State May Simplify Voting Rights Law, VIRGINIAN-
PILOT, June 19, 2002, at B3. This additional process would most likely apply 
to non-violent offenders. Mary Shaffrey, Voting Rights Eyed for Ex-felons, 
WASH. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at B01. 
169 Green, supra note 16; Shaffrey, supra note 168. 
170 Green, supra note 16; see also Nuckols, supra note 168. 
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passes in the General Assembly, it would be voted upon in a 
statewide referendum.171 Kenneth W. Stolle, Chairman of the 
Virginia State Crime Commission and a Republican state senator, 
initiated the creation of the task force.172 His participation in the 
task force is an illustration of the increased viability of 
disenfranchisement as a political issue. In the past, Stolle has 
stalled the passage of voting rights statutes that attempted to ease 
restrictions on ex-felons.173 
In Florida, Governor Jeb Bush and his cabinet passed rules 
that eased restrictions on ex-felons’ voting rights as of June 
2001.174 Ex-felons who are nonviolent and not classified as 
habitual offenders will be able to get their voting rights restored 
without a hearing by the Executive Board of Clemency.175 The 
new rules also reduce required paperwork and permit ex-felons 
who have not paid all of their court fees to vote.176 Additionally, 
the Florida Office of Executive Clemency recently shortened and 
                                                          
171 Shaffrey, supra note 168. Before the state’s constitution can be 
amended, however, the final plan must first be successful in separate 
referendums in two different legislative sessions. Id. at 180. In July 2000, 
Virginia’s restoration process was modified to permit ex-felons to petition 
circuit court judges in order to speed up the process. Roger Chesley, Efforts to 
Restore Voting Rights to Ex-felons Grind Along, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 17, 
2001, at B9. Since its inception, this measure has resulted in judicial approval 
of 27 requests, of which all but one were granted by the Governor. Id. 
172 See Heyser, supra note 160, at B1. 
173 Id. 
174 Florida Rules of Executive Clemency [hereinafter Florida Rules], 
available at http://www.state.fl.us/fpc/RULES-6-14-01.pdf; see also Julie 
Hauserman, supra note 16, at 4B. The changes were made after a bill in the 
House that would automatically restore voting rights to ex-felons failed to 
garner support throughout the state legislature. Mary Ellen Klas, House Panel: 
Ex-Inmates Should Have Right to Vote, PALM BEACH POST, Mar. 22, 2001, at 
11A; see also Editorial, Constructive Clemency, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 
17, 2001, at 2D. 
175 Florida Rules, supra note 174. Under the old rules, felons who had 
completed their sentences but still owed court fees and those who had been 
convicted of more than two felonies would be required to appear before a 
hearing of the Clemency Board. Maya Bell & Mark Silva, Felons Can Regain 
Rights More Easily, ORLANDO SENTINEL, June 15, 2001, at A1. 
176 Hauserman, supra note 16, at 4B. 
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simplified the form used by ex-felons to apply for restoration.177 
Before the form was changed, ex-felons were required to obtain 
certified copies of court records and notify the presiding or chief 
judge and prosecuting attorney of the application.178 
All of these state-initiated efforts reflect a changing societal 
view of criminal justice issues.179 The failure of harsh criminal 
punishments to adequately improve crime statistics as well as the 
prevalence of the disproportionate racial impact of such programs 
are factors that influence the way lawmakers view 
disenfranchisement.180 Disenfranchisement’s political viability is 
also enhanced by the participation of individuals who are 
affiliated with parties traditionally opposed to the relaxation of 
criminal justice standards.181 Given the current activity in state 
governments, therefore, the primary focus of felon 
disenfranchisement activists should be on developing legislation 
and courting political leaders who would be willing to alter such 
laws at the state level. This approach has the advantage of 
                                                          
177 Press Release, American Civil Liberties Union, ACLU Applauds 
Changes to Aid Restoration of Voting Rights in Florida, Urges Governor to 
Make Process Automatic (Apr. 24, 2002) [hereinafter Press Release], 
available at http://www.aclu.org/news/2002/n042402c.html. The state has 
reduced the size of the questionnaire used by felons to apply for the restoration 
of their voting rights from twelve pages to four. Bell & Silva, supra note 175, 
at A1. 
178 Press Release, supra note 177. 
179 Rapoport, supra note 149. 
180 Id. These factors have helped ex-felony disenfranchisement opponents 
gain bi-partisan support on the local government level. Id. 
181 Id. Connecticut Governor John Rowland and Virginia Chairman 
Kenneth Stolle are examples. Id.; see also Heyser, supra note 160. With 
support from politicians who traditionally have not been in favor of 
disenfranchisement efforts, there is a greater likelihood that cooperation will 
increase and modifications of disenfranchisement laws will be introduced more 
frequently and passed more rapidly. See Rapoport, supra note 149; see also 
Heyser, supra note 160. Furthermore, the presence of such politicians in the 
process helps to legitimize the movement by demonstrating that 
disenfranchisement is an issue that must and can be addressed on a broad 
scale. See id. (discussing Chairman Stolle’s reasons for being involved in the 
task force). 
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achieving results quickly and effectively.182 Moreover, it provides 
a direct way to change the laws instead of initiating a court 
proceeding that is lengthy and subject to appeals. 
CONCLUSION 
Efforts to change outdated felony disenfranchisement laws 
have had varying degrees of success.183 The court system has 
traditionally been the main focus in disenfranchisement activism, 
and many ex-felons have utilized different theories in order to 
attack the laws.184 In federal court, lawsuits have used 
constitutional arguments, centering on the Equal Protection 
clause as well as the 1965 Voting Rights Act.185 While these 
efforts provided initial promise, successes are few.186 In state 
courts, litigation has focused not only on federal constitutional 
provisions and laws, but also on the application of state statutes 
and constitutional provisions.187 While such lawsuits have more 
promise because of greater potential for flexibility in state laws, 
disenfranchisement laws have yet to be significantly changed 
                                                          
182 See Shapiro, supra note 17, at 4. Shapiro believes that “[t]ruly 
effective legislative reform must occur at the state level.” Id. 
183 See supra Part I (discussing disenfranchisement litigation); Part II 
(discussing legislative approaches). 
184 See supra Part I (analyzing the use of the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Voting Rights Act and state law theories in disenfranchisement lawsuits). 
185 See Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 225-28 (1985). 
186 Id. Those that do succeed are limited to cases where both the intent to 
discriminate and the impact of discrimination on a suspect class are obvious 
and egregious. Id.; see also supra Part I.B (explaining the implications of the 
decisions in Wesley v. Collins, 791 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1986), and Baker v. 
Pataki, 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996), in which litigants focused on Voting 
Rights Act claims). While the Act was specifically enacted to target voting 
qualifications that limit the rights of protected classes, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Act as requiring evidence of discriminatory intent in order to 
declare a state action invalid. See Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65 (1980). Despite 
Congress’ efforts to lessen that burden, federal courts consistently continue to 
apply the standard. See supra Part I.B (discussing cases in which the federal 
courts have declined to utilize the higher intent standard). 
187 See supra Part I.C (analyzing the approaches taken in state court 
litigation). 
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using this method.188 
In recent years, proposed legislation addressing the problem 
of felony disenfranchisement has increased on both the federal 
and state levels. The most significant federal bill, the Civic 
Participation and Rehabilitation Act of 1999, would guarantee all 
ex-felons the right to vote in federal elections.189 Because the bill 
was not enacted, however, its actual impact was minimal.190 
Efforts to attack disenfranchisement laws should be 
concentrated on the state and local legislatures. Bills and 
constitutional amendments in state legislatures have been 
frequently proposed and enacted throughout the country in recent 
years.191 These types of changes have had the most significant 
                                                          
188 See supra Part I.C (outlining the possible state court options in felony 
disenfranchisement lawsuits). While this approach has not yet been fully 
explored, litigants in state court have the option of using both federal 
constitutional rationales as well as any provided by the state’s own 
constitution, which may provide more constitutional leeway than the federal 
Constitution does. Id. 
189 H.R. 906, 106th Cong. (1999). This bill represents a significant 
achievement because it furthers political discussion of felony 
disenfranchisement in Congress. See supra note 144 (listing prominent 
legislators involved in the creation of H.R. 906). Because felony 
disenfranchisement has typically not attracted nationally known politicians to 
champion the issue, the fact that legislation was introduced and considered in a 
U.S. House committee demonstrates that the political atmosphere may be 
shifting, if only slightly, to create a more favorable environment to raise such 
issues. Id. 
190 Hearing, supra note 132. The bill died in the Judiciary committee after 
the October 21, 1999 hearing. Id.; see also ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, 
at 12; Miller, supra note 146. 
191 See supra Part II.B (giving examples of states in which constitutional 
amendments and bills have been debated and/or passed). Local legislators have 
been influential in amending state constitutions to ease voting restrictions on 
both felons and ex-felons. See, e.g., H.R. 126, 140th Gen. Assem. (Del. 
2000) (amending the Delaware constitution to permit persons convicted of 
certain felonies excluding murder, manslaughter, offenses against public 
administration including bribery, and sexual offenses to vote after being 
pardoned or five years after the completion of their sentences). Legislators 
have also created task forces to streamline the pardon process. See, e.g., 
Green, supra note 16 (describing the task force set up by the Virginia State 
Crime Commission to address the restoration of voting rights for ex-felons). 
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and influential impact on improving access to the ballot box, and 
the changes have occurred throughout the country, including in 
several Southern states.192 Such modifications have the most 
potential to reinstate voting rights to the greatest number of 
people.193 Therefore, in states that continue to enforce restrictive 
disenfranchisement laws, the best avenue to combat these laws 
lies in the local legislature. 
 
 
                                                          
Finally, they have restored the right to vote to thousands in the felony 
population. FELLNER & MAUER, supra note 4, at 8. In Delaware, twenty 
percent of black men were permanently disenfranchised under the old felony 
disenfranchisement statute. Id. Connecticut disenfranchised over 42,000 ex-
felons under the previous statute. Id. at 9. In New Mexico, four percent, or 
almost 50,000 ex-felons were disenfranchised before the passage of the 2001 
bill. Id. See supra Part II.B (outlining additional material regarding the new 
legislation in these states). 
192 ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 4. For example, efforts were 
taken in 1999 in Alabama’s House to pass legislation requiring that the Board 
of Pardons and Parole automatically restore voting rights upon completion of a 
felon’s sentence. Id.; see supra Part II.B (providing information regarding the 
efforts underway in Florida and Virginia). 
193 See ALLARD & MAUER, supra note 4, at 2 (noting enhanced voting 
activity in seven states). The range and scope of actions being taken 
throughout the country to change disenfranchisement laws is illustrative of the 
potential significant impact state legislation can have on this issue. Id. 
Furthermore, the political climate in the states has become more favorable to 
changes, which makes lobbying local legislators the most productive avenue. 
See supra Part II.B (illustrating that politicians in several states are working 
together in a bi-partisan effort to modify the existing disenfranchisement 
laws). 
